Effects of restricting pub closing times on night-time assaults in an Australian city by Kypri, Kypros et al.
Effects of restricting pub closing times on night-time
assaults in an Australian cityadd_3125 303..310
Kypros Kypri
1, Craig Jones
2, Patrick McElduff
1 & Daniel Barker
1
School of Medicine and Public Health, University of Newcastle, NSW,Australia1 and NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, NSW,Australia2
ABSTRACT
Aims In March 2008 the New South Wales judiciary restricted pub closing times to 3 a.m., and later 3.30 a.m., in
the central business district (CBD) of Newcastle, Australia. We sought to determine whether the restriction reduced
the incidence of assault. Design Non-equivalent control group design with before and after observations. Setting
Newcastle, a city of 530 000 people. Participants People apprehended for assault in the CBD and nearby Hamilton,
an area with a similar night-time economy but where no restriction was imposed. Measurements Police-recorded
assaults in the CBD before and after the restriction were compared with those in Hamilton. Cases were assaults
occurring from 10 p.m.–6 a.m. from January 2001–March 2008, with April 2008–September 2009 as the post-
restriction period. We also examined changes in assault incidence by time of night. Negative binomial regression with
time, area, time ¥ area interaction terms and terms for secular trend and seasonal effects was used to analyse the data.
Autocorrelation was examined using generalized estimating equations. Findings In the CBD, recorded assaults fell
from 99.0 per quarter before the restriction to 67.7 per quarter afterward [incidence rate ratio (IRR): 0.66, 95%
conﬁdence interval (CI): 0.55–0.80]. In the same periods in Hamilton, assault rates were 23.4 and 25.5 per quarter,
respectively (IRR: 1.02, 95% CI: 0.79–1.31). The relative reduction attributable to the intervention was 37%
(IRR = 0.63, 95% CI: 0.47–0.81) and approximately 33 assault incidents were prevented per quarter. Conclusion
This study indicates that a restriction in pub closing times to 3/3.30 a.m. in Newcastle, NSW, produced a large relative
reduction in assault incidence of 37% in comparison to a control locality.
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INTRODUCTION
In many countries there continues to be intense public
interest in the trading hours of alcohol outlets. Encour-
agingly, local, state and national governments appear
increasingly interested in the application of research evi-
dence to the regulation of the liquor trade. Given the
demand for evidence, there is surprisingly little research
literature on the effects of changes in trading hours. In
the two major reviews of empirical evidence on alcohol
policy in recent decades [1,2], there are just a few short
paragraphs on the role of trading hours.
The tendency in the post-war years in many countries
has been to liberalize alcohol control policies [1], such
that what evidence exists pertains mainly to the effects of
later closing (i.e. liberalization of trade), with only a few
studies of the effects of earlier closing (i.e. restriction
of trade). A recent narrative review by Stockwell &
Chikritzhs [3] of the effects of changes in trading hours
examined 14 studies employing pre–post measurement
and control sites, of which 13 were liberalization studies.
In general, increasing trading hours was reported to be
associated with a higher incidence of alcohol-related
harm [3].
Four further studies, three of which were not covered
in the review by Stockwell & Chikritzhs (i.e. [4–7]) exam-
ined the effects of regulations requiring earlier closing.
Consistentwiththeliberalizationstudiesreferredtoabove,
the typical ﬁnding was that earlier closing was associ-
ated with less alcohol-related harm. It should be noted,
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these restriction studies generalize less well to the cir-
cumstances faced by most liquor licensing policy makers
which, typically, do not include management of national
border crossings or remote indigenous communities.
The present investigation arose from a regulatory
change applied in Newcastle, New South Wales (NSW),
Australia’s seventh largest city (population 530 000).
Licensedpremiseswithlatetradinglicencesinthecentral
business district (CBD) of Newcastle had been shown to
have a high incidence of assault [8] and, more generally,
intoxication in licensed premises in NSW was reported to
be commonplace despite a law proscribing admission or
service of intoxicated individuals [9].
In NSW, alcohol outlet licensing is managed by the
State Government’s Ofﬁce of Liquor Gaming and Racing
(known as the Liquor Administration Board until 30
June 2008). In 2007, formal complaints about violence,
damage to property and disorderly behaviour arising
from service to intoxication in the Newcastle CBD were
madebytheNSWPoliceandmembersof thecommunity.
As a result, in 2008 the Liquor Administration Board
restricted opening hours of 14 pubs in the CBD from
5 a.m. to 3 a.m., with a 1 a.m. lockout, effective from 21
March 2008. Under the lockout conditions patrons could
continuetodrinkalcoholonthepremisesuntil3 a.m.but
no new patrons could be admitted after 1 a.m., thus it is
also known as a ‘one-way door’ policy.
The pubs mounted a legal challenge to the ruling and
as a consequence of an out-of-court bargain with the
NSW police on 29 July 2008, the restriction was relaxed
to3.30 a.m.closingwitha1.30 a.m.lockout.Wesought
to test the hypothesis that this intervention would reduce
the incidence of assault in the Newcastle CBD. In addi-
tion, we sought to determine whether there was any
displacement in assault incidence from the CBD to the
nearby control area.
METHODS
Design
We adopted a non-equivalent control group design [10]
inwhichtheCBDwastheinterventionareaandanearby
area with similar characteristics served as the control
area. Ideally, one would have several control areas, all
affectedidenticallybydeterminantsof drinkingandother
assault risk factors, e.g. by macro-economic conditions
and transport variables. They would consist of the same
demographicmixof patrons,thesametypesof outlets,be
beyond convenient walking distance from the interven-
tion area and be smaller than the intervention area, so
that displacement from the intervention area could be
detected readily.
Study sites
Figure 1 shows the location and boundaries of the CBD
2300 and 2302 postcode areas (intervention) and the
Hamilton 2303 postcode area (control). Hamilton was
selected as a control area because, like the CBD, it is con-
sidered an entertainment precinct and includes several
latetradingpubsof similarcharactertothoseintheCBD,
and because closing times were not curtailed. Critically, it
would be subject to similar economic, transport and cli-
matic conditions, all of which are known to affect drink-
ing behaviour in public locations. As shall be seen, the
perpetrators and victims of assault in Hamilton are
approximately 5 years older than those in the CBD, and
the area occupied by pubs is considerably smaller than
thatintheCBD.Insummary,Hamiltonhasmany,butnot
all,of thefeaturesof anidealcontrolsiteandthereareno
other entertainment precincts in the Newcastle region
suitable for comparison.
The intervention
In addition to the changes in closing hours described
above,licenseeswererequiredtoadoptaplanof manage-
ment; were subject to compliance audits; had to have
a dedicated responsible service of alcohol ofﬁcer from
11 p.m. until closing; could not serve shots after 10 p.m.;
had to cease selling alcohol 30 minutes prior to closing;
could not permit stockpiling of drinks; had to adopt
shared radio procedures; and all staff had to be notiﬁed
of the conditions. Importantly, pubs in Hamilton, the
control area, reportedly began to adopt most elements
of the intervention voluntarily from November 2008.
Laterreportscastdoubtonthedegreeof compliancewith
the voluntary restrictions in Hamilton [11].
Case deﬁnition
Cases were non-domestic violence incidents that were
reported to or detected by police. Assault incidents
included common assault, actual or grievous bodily
harm,assaultof policeorshootingwithintentotherthan
to murder, as deﬁned under the NSW Crimes Act 1900,
and irrespective of whether or not there was a subse-
quent charge or conviction. Cases were limited to those
occurring between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. within either the
CBD postcode areas or the Hamilton postcode area. Such
incidents could include any number of people who were
recorded as either a person of interest (i.e. a possible per-
petrator) or victim. It should be noted that the analysis of
the effect of the restriction in closing times was based
upon the count of incidents, not of individuals.
The intervention took effect on 21 March 2008.
At the time of the study, post-test data were available to
30 September 2009. A relatively stable period in assault
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March 2008 (28 quarters), was chosen for comparison
with the post-intervention period of April 2008–
September 2009 (six quarters).
Analysis
We used negative binomial regression to model the
number of assaults per month in the before and after
periods.The negative binomial model included a variable
to indicate the periods before and after the intervention
and a variable to indicate the area in which the assault
occurred. The difference in the change in the number of
assaults across the intervention period between the two
areas was tested using an interaction term between the
before and after variable and the area variable.The expo-
nent of the coefﬁcient of the interaction term from this
model,thatistheincidencerateratio(IRR),isanestimate
of the relative difference in the percentage change in the
number of assaults in the CBD compared with Hamilton
[12].
Additionally, a variable for the time (in months) from
thestartof thestudywasaddedtothemodeltoadjustfor
anyseculartrendinassaultsthatmayhaveoccurredover
the study period, and a categorical variable for month
of the year was added to adjust for any seasonal varia-
tion.The results presented in the tables within this paper
are from a model that does not adjust for serial auto-
correlation. We did, however, ﬁt the same model into a
generalized estimating equation (GEE) framework, which
allowed us to include an autoregressive term to adjust for
autocorrelation within cluster, but there are concerns
about the standard errors of these models being unduly
smallwhenthenumberof clustersissmall[13].STATA’s
implementation of a GEE allows the use of bootstrapping
and the effect sizes and 95% conﬁdence intervals (CIs)
estimated from the bootstrap models are presented in the
text. In addition, we tested the robustness of the results
using a traditional time–series approach, i.e. by ﬁtting
an autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA)
model separately for the time–series within each area.
The results of these two models were entirely consistent
with the ﬁndings from the negative binomial regression
models and GEEs and they are not reported here.
To examine any temporal shift in the number of
assaults we reﬁtted the above models restricting the
data to the two separate time periods of 10 p.m.–
2.59 a.m. and 3 a.m.–6 a.m.The analyses were repeated
Figure 1 Location of study sites: central business district (CBD) (postcodes 2300 and 2302) and Hamilton (postcode 2303)
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test for the possibility that patrons shifted their drinking
(and therefore assaults) to a much earlier period.
The number of events that would have occurred in
the CBD had the change in closing times not taken place
was estimated by multiplying the average number of
events observed per quarter in the CBD prior to the inter-
vention by the IRR across the intervention period in
Hamilton. The number of events prevented by the inter-
vention was estimated by subtracting the number of
events that actually occurred in Newcastle from the
number estimated to have occurred if the change in
closing times had not taken place. Chi-square tests were
used to examine differences in the percentage of assaults
between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. that occurred after 3 a.m.
within each area.
It is possible that as a consequence of being under
regulatory scrutiny, licensees in the CBD under-reported
assaults to police after the intervention was initiated
to a greater extent than beforehand. We therefore under-
took a manual review of reports to police according
to their source, before and after the intervention com-
menced in the CBD and Hamilton, by way of assessing
this potential threat to the validity of ﬁndings. Given the
labour-intensiveness of the manual search, this could
be conducted for only one quarter before the change
(October–December 2007) and the corresponding
quarter in the following year (October–December
2008).
RESULTS
Assault incidence in the study sites before and after
the intervention
Figure 2 shows the number of assaults in the January–
March, April–June, July–September and October–
December quarters in the period January 2001 to
September 2009, in the CBD and Hamilton. The ﬁgure
suggests a gradual increase in assault incidence in the
Hamilton area. The series appears more volatile in the
CBD, although it should be noted that this is due mainly
to scaling effects. There was a dramatic reduction in
assaults in the ﬁnal quarter of 2008 followed by an
increase in the ﬁrst two quarters of 2009 and a decrease
in the third quarter. Overall, counts for the last four quar-
ters of the series were well below the range of values
expected in the absence of an intervention.
Demographic details of assault perpetrators and victims
Table 1 presents the age and gender distributions of
persons of interest (who include suspected assailants)
and assault victims in each area before and after the
intervention. It should be noted that in contrast to the
analyses concerning the effects of the change in closing
times, which are incident-based, the summary presented
in Table 1 is person-based. This is due to the fact that for
any particular assault investigated by police, there could
be several persons of interest and/or victims. Table 1
shows that the perpetrators and victims of assault are
overwhelmingly young men. Perpetrators and victims of
assault were, on average, 5 years older in Hamilton than
in the CBD.
Test of primary hypothesis
Table 2 summarizes the primary results. It shows that
there was a 34% reduction in assault incidence in the
interventionareaandanon-signiﬁcantincreaseof 2%in
the control area in the same period. The relative effect,
i.e. the effect of the intervention adjusting for the assault
incidence in Hamilton, is given by the ratio of the inci-
dence rate ratios in the two study sites, i.e. a 37% relative
reduction[(1–0.63) ¥ 100],whichequatesto33assaults
prevented per quarter [(99.0 ¥ 1.02)-67.7]. Analysed
Figure 2 Assaults per quarter, January
2001–September 2009, in central business
district (CBD) (intervention area) and
Hamilton (control area)
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identical (IRR: 0.63) to that in the negative binomial
regression model, albeit with a wider conﬁdence interval
(95% CI: 0.40–0.99).
When the data were analysed separately by time
of incident, effect estimates were markedly larger for
assaults occurring between 3 a.m. and 6 a.m. (67% rela-
tive reduction; IRR: 0.33, 95% CI: 0.19–0.56) than for
those occurring between 10 p.m. and 2.59 a.m. (26%
relative reduction; IRR: 0.74, 95% CI: 0.56–0.89). For
the earlier period (6 p.m.–9.59 p.m.) there was a non-
signiﬁcant increase in assault incidence in the CBD (from
15 to 17.5 assaults per quarter, RR: 1.17, CI 0.9–1.5),
and no change in Hamilton (9.3 per quarter before and
after the restriction, RR: 1.0; CI 0.7–1.4).
Test of secondary hypothesis
In the CBD before the intervention 27% of assaults
occurred after 3 a.m. This decreased to 12% after the
intervention (P < 0.0001). In Hamilton, corresponding
ﬁgures were 21% and 20% (P = 0.65). Figure 3 illus-
trates this ﬁnding, suggesting that the intervention effect
shown in Table 2 occurred via the anticipated mecha-
nism of reducing the overall number of assaults in the
CBD without causing displacement to nearby Hamilton
after 3 a.m. or 3.30 a.m. closing.
Examination of potential selection bias
Table 3 presents the number and proportion of assaults
recorded in the CBD and Hamilton, by person reporting
the assault and year (October–December of 2007 versus
October–December of 2008). Pub staff reported fewer
than 10% of the incidents in the data set, and the change
in the number of events reported over time in the CBD
(9.9–7.7%) was non-signiﬁcant. No support was found
forthehypothesisthatthereportingpracticesof licensees
could explain the differences evident in Table 2.
DISCUSSION
The principal ﬁnding is consistent with the primary
hypothesis, i.e. the restriction in closing time appears to
have produced a reduction in assault incidence against a
backdrop of a stable trend in the control area. This was
despite a watering-down of the original restriction (from
3 a.m. to 3.30 a.m. 4 months in) and possible contami-
nation in the form of voluntary adoption of some inter-
vention elements in the control site. There does not
appear to have been geographic displacement to Hamil-
ton, i.e. an increase in assaults as a consequence of
patrons either moving to Hamilton from the CBD after
3.30 a.m. closing or choosing to frequent Hamilton pubs
instead of those in the CBD. Displacement to other areas
Table 1 Gender and age distributions of people involved in assaults in the study areas, before and after the change in closing time.
CBD Hamilton
Males Females Males Females
Person of interest
Before
a 1541 (82%) 340 (18%) 381 (83%) 80 (17%)
After 209 (82%) 46 (18%) 79 (80%) 20 (20%)
Mean age (SD) 23.8 (7.4) 21.5 (6.7) 28.7 (9.4) 26.1 (7.8)
Victim
Before 2705 (81%) 619 (19%) 644 (83%) 131 (17%)
After 377 (76%) 118 (24%) 141 (77%) 41 (23%)
Mean age (SD) 25.6 (8.3) 23.7 (7.6) 30.5 (9.8) 29.3 (9.7)
aBefore: January 2001–March 2008; after: April 2008–September 2009. CBD: central business district; SD: standard deviation.
Table 2 Assaults per quarter before and after the change in closing time.
Beforea n Aftera n
Before-to-after incidence
rate ratiob (95% CI)
Relative before-to-after
incidence rate ratiob (95% CI) P
CBD (intervention area) 99.0 67.7 0.66 (0.55–0.80) 0.63 (0.49, 0.81) 0.0003
c
Hamilton (control area) 23.4 25.5 1.02 (0.79–1.31) 1.00 Reference –
aBefore: January 2001–March 2008; after: April 2008–September 2009. bIncidence rate ratios are adjusted to take into account the variation by month
of the year (seasonal effect) and time since January 2001 (secular trend) and therefore they are not necessarily the same as those estimated by division
of crudenumberswithinthetable. cForarea ¥ timeinteractionterminnegativebinomialregressionmodel.CBD:centralbusinessdistrict;CI:conﬁdence
interval.
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noted that there are no other entertainment precincts in
the city with clusters of late trading pubs.
Notably, signiﬁcant reductions in assault rates were
evident only in the third quarter after the law change. A
lag is plausible—it may have taken time for patrons’ pat-
terns of going out drinking to change in response to the
new closing times. It should also be noted that in the ﬁrst
two quarters after the restriction took effect, assaults
increasedinthecontrolarearelativetotheprecedingtwo
quarters.
Strengths of the study include the use of a control site
which confers signiﬁcantly greater capacity for a valid
causal inference over the one-group pre-test–post-test
design [10]. For example, this design reduces the likeli-
hood that macroeconomic factors, some of which are
known to affect drinking behaviour [2], biased the analy-
sis. In the period studied there was a global economic
crisis and dramatic changes in the price of petrol, both of
which will have affected how much money people could
spend on going out and purchasing alcohol, and there-
fore may have reduced the total exposure to the risk of
assault.These effects are unlikely to have occurred differ-
entially in the CBD and Hamilton and therefore the effect
estimate should not have been biased.
A priori limitations of the study include possible
differences in police activity and pub staff reporting of
assaults in the two areas before and after the restriction.
The former is an example of a service delivery variable
potentially confounding valid causal inference [14]. If,
as a consequence of the intervention, more police were
temporarily put onto the street in the CBD and/or they
became more zealous than usual in apprehending people
for assault, the detection rate may have been inﬂated
Figure 3 Distributions of assaults by time
in central business district (CBD) (interven-
tion area) and Hamilton (control area)
before and after the change in closing time
Table 3 Numberandproportionof assaultsrecordedincentralbusinessdistrict(CBD)andHamilton,bypersonreportingtheassault
and year.
Location/time period
Reported/detected by
Pub staff Police Victim Other Unclear
n( % ) n( % ) n( % ) n( % ) n( % )
CBD
October–December 2007 13 (9.9) 16 (12.2) 51 (38.9) 40 (30.5) 11 (8.4)
October–December 2008 7 (7.7) 6 (6.6) 35 (38.5) 35 (38.5) 8 (8.8)
c
2
4 = 3.0, P = 0.554
Hamilton
October–December 2007 4 (8.2) 1 (2.0) 19 (38.8) 20 (40.8) 5 (10.2)
October–December 2008 1 (1.7) 6 (10.3) 24 (41.4) 20 (34.5) 7 (12.1)
c
2
4 = 5.6a, P = 0.234
aNote: counts of <5 in some cells affect the reliability of the c2 statistic.
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theinterventioneffect.Itisdifﬁculttoimagineaplausible
scenario in which this bias could operate in favour of the
studyhypothesis;however,intheabsenceof independent
data on policing levels it is impossible to do more than
speculate.
A more plausible threat to the validity of the effect
estimate might be that in the wake of prominent adverse
publicity about assaults in and around licensed premises,
pub owners advised their staff to avoid calling the police
in the event that a patron committed an assault on or
near the premises. Such a practice would have artiﬁcially
deﬂatedpolicecountsof assaultincidenceuponwhichour
estimatesdepended.If thisoccurredtoagreaterextentin
the CBD than in the Hamilton area, and more so after the
intervention than before, the intervention effect could
have been overestimated; however, our analysis of the
source of assault records showed that this did not occur.
Given that fewer than 10% of assault reports originated
with licensed premises, it would have been impossible
for this to explain the observed changes in assault inci-
denceevenif suchapracticehadbeenadoptedcompletely.
Whiletheabovesuggeststhattheobservedtime ¥ area
interaction (i.e. the intervention effect) is not artefactual,
it remains possible that the effects are due, wholly or in
part,tofactorsotherthantherestrictioninclosingtimes.
At the time of the intervention, pubs were subject to
adversepublicityfrommediareportsinMarch2008[15]
of a‘top100list’obtainedfromtheNSWBureauof Crime
Statistics and Research. The report ranked the 100 pubs
inNSWwiththelargestnumberof assaultsoccurringon
the premises. Notably, ﬁve of those pubs were in the CBD
(36% of all the pubs subject to the intervention and 17%
of all the pubs in the CBD) and three were in Hamilton
(30%of allthepubsinthecontrolarea).Itislikelythatas
aconsequenceof thepublicity,pubsmodiﬁedtheirservice
and security practices and this may have reduced assault
rates independently of the restriction in closing times.
However, given that ‘top 100’ pubs were present in both
the intervention and control sites, any such effect is
unlikely to have biased the closing time effect estimate.
Other changes that occurred during the period
covered in this evaluation include the introduction of a
new Liquor Act, which came into effect on 1 July 2008,
and the announcement by the NSW Premier of ‘Top 48’
legislation in October 2008, which imposed various
restrictions on the service practices of pubs with the
worstassaultrecords.Asabove,theinferenceconcerning
the effect of restrictions in closing times is protected by
the inclusion of a control site subject to the same condi-
tions as those in place in the intervention site.
The voluntary adoption of aspects of the intervention
by some pubs in the control area from late 2008 creates
the possibility that the effect estimate has been biased
towards the null. Figure 2 shows that the assault inci-
dence rates in Hamilton were lower in 2009 than in
2008, so it is possible that the voluntary measures had a
small protective effect. If so, the true effect of the restric-
tion placed on pubs in the CBD area would be greater
than that estimated here.
There may be beneﬁt in analysing outcomes that
are less susceptible to selection biases. While emergency
department admissions for assault are an obvious candi-
date, the location of the assault incident is not recorded
routinely in the medical record, making it impossible to
distinguishbetweenincidentsintheCBDandotherareas.
Ambulance attendances for assault appear to be a possi-
bility as long as the location of the patient at the time of
the assault can be ascertained, which is currently being
investigated.
The ﬁndings are consistent with the small literature
on restriction studies and therefore with the broader
availabilityhypothesis;namely,thatincreasingthephysi-
cal and/or economic availability of alcohol increases
consumption and therefore alcohol-related harm [1]. It
should be noted that in practice it is rare for physical
availability to increase without also increasing the
promotion of alcohol (e.g. in ‘happy hour’ advertising,
at point of sale, etc.), i.e. the supposed mechanism of
action is not only supply-side, but also involves stimulat-
ing demand for alcohol.
There are also factors not related directly to alcohol
consumption that affect the incidence of assault, e.g.
overcrowding,socialdeprivationandpatronmix[16,17].
By restricting closing times, the intervention may have
reduced the number of people coming into the CBD and
thereby reduced the likelihood of aggressive interactions
between patrons within, outside and travelling between
licensed premises.
The intervention appears to have reduced assaults
after 3 a.m. dramatically (by two-thirds), even though
the latest permissible closing time for 14 of the 18 post-
interventionmonthswas3.30 a.m.Therelativecontribu-
tionof therebeingpossiblyfewerpatronsintheCBDafter
3 a.m. than previously, and that those who were present
werelessintoxicated,isunknown.Thattherewasaninter-
ventioneffect(a26%relativereduction)between10 p.m.
and 2.59 a.m. suggests that reduced exposure (i.e. fewer
people visiting the CBD area) may explain at least part of
the observed reduction in assaults later on. In addition, it
is possible that aspects of the intervention other than the
restriction in closing times affected patron behaviour via
modiﬁcation of service and other management practices.
There are several reasons to be cautious about these
results: (1) the possibility that the two areas are not
sufﬁciently comparable to form a valid counterfactual to
the intervention (e.g. assault perpetrators in Hamilton
were 5 years older than those in the CBD); (2) that an
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presence of an effect (albeit smaller) at earlier as well as
latertimes.Inrelationtotheﬁrstpoint,itshouldbenoted
that in this particular case the result of the conditional
analysis (i.e. of the change in the CBD versus that in
Hamilton) was not sensitive to what occurred in the
control site because assault incidence was stable in
the period in question. With regard to the third point, it
should be noted that changes in trading hours shown in
previousstudiestoaffectratesof assaultandotherharms
(see [3] for a review) occurred largely in the absence of
thekindsof strategiesintroducedintheCBD(e.g.theban
on shots after 10 p.m.). These ﬁndings, and the lack of
evidence one way or the other on the effects of the other
strategies implemented in the CBD, lend support to
reduced exposure as an explanation for the reduction in
assaults observed between 10 p.m. and 3 a.m.
The lack of data on patron travel behaviour (e.g.
counts of people moving into and out of the area on
Saturday nights by various modes of transport) and
drinking behaviour (e.g. breath alcohol levels measured
at sentinel locations at speciﬁed times, or pub alcohol
sales data) makes it impossible to determine whether the
intervention worked via the assumed mechanisms. It
underlines the importance of designing evaluations in
anticipation of important policy changes such as that
examined here, which would require government to
adopt a more active role as a contributor to the develop-
ment of research evidence rather than being merely a
consumer of it [18].
In addition to examining other sources of data (e.g.
ambulance attendances) in relation to the Newcastle
intervention, further research is required to examine the
effectsof lockouts.Thesearenowusedwidelybutthereis
little or no evidence concerning their effectiveness. In the
meantime, licensing authorities presented with similar
assault and disorder problems may be emboldened by
these ﬁndings and should be encouraged to implement
similar restrictions with suitable evaluation.
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